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1. Introduction 
Although the effects of financial disclosure have been widely discussed in relation to 
developed countries, few studies (Abraham et al., 2015) have focused on emerging markets, 
owing to difficulties identifying the real effect of disclosures, as many institutional variables 
influence the growth of capital markets. This paper fills this gap by focusing on China, one 
of the so-called “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), that is at an advanced 
stage of economic development, and has had relatively greater influence on the global 
economy in recent years (Chen and Wang, 2004). 
According to Li et al. (2013), the securities market in China has become a major 
global stock exchange in terms of total capitalisation, trading volume and the rapid growth 
in both the number and size of public companies. There are two official national exchanges 
in China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), established in 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE), founded in 1991. A-shares and B-shares can be issued by both exchange 
markets; A-shares are issued for domestic investors, denominated in renminbi (RMB), and 
B-shares are issued for foreign investors, predominantly in foreign currency. Chinese listed 
firms apply different accounting regulations depending on the type of security issued, 
whether A- or B-shares, or both (Elshandidy, 2014). 
The Chinese regulatory system arguably acknowledges the important role played by 
the financial reporting system in progressing economic development. The Chinese Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) has set itself the objectives of fostering investors' confidence in financial 
information, increasing the transparency of financial reporting, and harmonising Chinese 
national accounting standards with IFRS (Deloitte, 2015). Although the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has continuously improved its laws and regulations, by 
introducing many reforms to financial reporting disclosure, the effectiveness of the 
information disclosure system remains underplayed (Zhang and Zhang, 2014). Crucially, 
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despite promoting private ownership, international investment and entrepreneurial ventures, 
the Chinese government retains tight control of entrepreneurial activities (Elshandidy, 2014). 
The fact that the state still plays a significant, or even dominant, role in many financial 
companies, generates unique characteristics in terms of disclosure, given the structure of the 
Chinese financial market. 
Despite the many actions taken in the last decade in China to ensure risk disclosure, 
the quality of risk reporting by financial firms continues to be empirically debatable (Wang et 
al., 2008). Regarding risk reporting in other contexts; over the last decade a wealth of 
literature has emerged concerning investors’ risk perceptions of capital markets, observing 
the effects of risk disclosure (Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). These studies share a 
recognition that the motivations for risk related information can be explained by agency 
theory, when evaluating the capacity of risk disclosure to decrease information asymmetries 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). The effects of disclosure on market liquidity are well 
documented in developed countries (Miihkinen, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and 
Neri, 2015); however, as mentioned above, less attention has been given to emerging 
markets. This is especially important if we consider the situational context of the financial 
companies listed in the Chinese market: factors like the high percentage of state ownership 
and the low percentage of negotiable securities (OECD, 2011) render the risk disclosure of 
financial companies in the Chinese context fundamental to investors and analysts. 
Our paper addresses this gap by answering the following two questions: (1) Whether, 
and if so how, did companies’ characteristics influence risk disclosure quality in China for 
financial listed companies for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015?; and (2) To what extent did 
the quality of risk information reduce information asymmetry, by improving market liquidity 
between market participants in China for financial listed companies during the period 2013-
2015?  
Our findings suggest that firm characteristics (especially size) influence risk 
disclosure practices of Chinese financial companies. Furthermore, we found that risk 
disclosure quality has an impact on market liquidity, and when we analysed each year we 
noticed that the results were driven by the year 2013; moreover, we noticed no or little 
significance from the period of the emerging financial crisis in 2014. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it draws on 
previous studies (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Miihkinen, 2012) to identify the influence of firm 
characteristics and risk disclosure quality, to understand how such disclosure might impact 
the market liquidity of an emerging market such as China. This will be of interest to 
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investors, since there has been no significant previous research into the quality of risk 
disclosure practices in China. The time span of three years will be helpful in trying to 
identify patterns of behaviour in the years before, during and after the crisis. The 
importance of this paper resides in its provision of evidence concerning several reporting 
incentives detailing not only the quantity, but also the quality of firms’ risk reporting. This 
will function as a set of guidelines for investors’ decision making, and may also motivate 
reforms and the enhancement of regulations in China, in order to make the market more 
efficient. 
Section 2 sets out the background to Chinese market regulation. Section 3 reviews 
previous literature and develops our hypotheses. In Section 4, we introduce our 
methodology and describe our sample. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and 
provides further analysis, and Section 6 draws conclusions, discusses the limitations of the 
study, and suggests future research areas.  
 
2. Background and regulation of the Chinese market 
In 2015 the Shanghai stock market faced a crisis that led to a reassessment of the market. In 
the previous 12 months, it had registered a 150 per cent increase in stock value, but this rise 
had not been accompanied by a similar growth in earnings (Deloitte, 2015). Even with this 
rise, Shanghai’s market index has experienced poor performance since 2012, compared with 
other stock indexes (UK stocks moved up by 5.8 per cent for instance). This is mostly due 
to the specific characteristics of the Chinese stock market; not only is it still underdeveloped 
(Luo et al., 2009), but the government has made use of it as a fundraising tool for funding 
state-owned and state-controlled companies (which account for a high percentage of the 
listed companies). Furthermore, China’s stock market developed under a repressed financial 
market and in a weak legal environment, which has offered little protection to shareholders. 
Although La Porta et al. (2008) identify China’s legal system as originating from 
German civil law, a unique characteristic of China’s legal tradition is that the judicial system 
is not independent of the government’s administrative system (Zhang and Zhang, 2014). 
Concentrated state ownership, unclear laws governing private property rights, and a lack of 
judicial independence therefore characterise China’s market, as the government protects 
state interests over the rights of individuals.  
Additionally, given the stock segmentation, China’s stock market is not immediately 
accessible to foreign investors (even though the picture has changed rapidly in the last years) 
and this affects China’s stock market integration. As stated above, on the SSE, A-shares and 
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B-shares are listed, with A-shares priced in the local RMB currency and intended for 
domestic investors only, and B-shares listed in US dollars and distributable to overseas 
investors. However, since 2002, China has permitted foreign institutional investors to 
purchase bonds or stocks listed in the Chinese A-share market, explaining why A-shares are 
the most important segment of China’s stock market (Deloitte, 2015). 
Chinese regulators have closely followed the development of the Basel Accords and 
have shown a strong willingness to integrate international regulatory rules into Chinese 
regulatory practices, with some adaptations for market features. In 2008, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) finalised Basel II implementation in China through the 
publication of five sets of guidance. In 2010, the CBRC released the Implementation of 
Four New Supervisory Instruments (Draft Discussion) to merge Basel III’s new tools for 
capital adequacy, anti-cyclical capital charge, liquidity and bank regulation into the Chinese 
regulatory framework. In 2013, China adopted reforms regarding corporate disclosure rules, 
which modified the landscape considerably, and in December 2015 the CSRC rolled out a 
series of money market funds provisions to strike a balance between the need for innovation 
and risk minimisation in capital markets, with the main aims being to improve disclosure 
and transparency.  
 
3. Literature review and research hypotheses 
3.1 Literature review 
Previous studies have confirmed that firm characteristics relate to corporate risk disclosure. 
When testing associations between firm characteristics and risk information disclosed, 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) found that firm size and level of environmental risk are passively 
associated with the amount of risk disclosure. Abraham and Cox (2007) also suggest that 
corporate governance is an important factor to consider when studying risk disclosure 
drivers. Elshandidy et al. (2013) examine the relationship between risk disclosures and firm 
risk levels. Consistent with managers’ incentive (agency and signalling) theories, their results 
confirm that risky firms are likely to significantly disclose risk information, suggesting 
managers are motivated to provide higher levels of information to reduce information 
asymmetry (Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). According to a 
study by Miihkinen (2012), in the presence of detailed risk disclosure standards and 
guidelines, firms disclose more qualitative risk information and action plans relating to 
economic impacts, thereby improving the quality of firms’ overall risk reviews. 
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In terms of the impact of risk disclosure, information asymmetry is a long-standing 
concern for both investors and regulators. The results of research by Verrecchia (2001) 
show that, in imperfectly competitive markets, the degree of information asymmetry is 
related to market illiquidity and the cost of capital. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) 
theorise that firms with valid risk disclosures have lower risk premiums. When risk 
disclosures are voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, risk premiums also tend to be lower. In 
addition, improved information disclosure increases market liquidity, because investors are 
less likely to feel uninformed and artificially raise prices. These arguments are empirically 
supported by Elshandidy and Neri’s (2015) findings. Consistent with these results, Campbell 
et al. (2014) conclude that, when the bid-ask price is used as a proxy for market liquidity, the 
risk factor is positively related to a reduction in information asymmetry.  
3.2 Research hypotheses: Main determinants and impacts on market liquidity 
3.2.1 Firm size 
According to agency theory, larger firms tend to incur lower disclosure costs than smaller 
firms, as agency theory argues that larger firms need to disclose more information to 
different user groups leading to a decline in agency costs and reducing information 
asymmetries (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). However, in prior studies, the association 
between firm size and level of disclosure has proven to be either negative or positive. Kou 
and Hussain (2007) observe a negative relationship between firm size and disclosures, 
whereas Linsley and Shrives’ (2006) work supports a positive relationship between the two. 
Risk reporting literature highlights no significant influence from firm size on the 
quantity and/or quality of risk disclosure (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004), on negative relations, 
(Campbell et al., 2014) or positive influences on aggregated disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). In a study of 559 Chinese firms in 2002, Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) find that larger firms offer greater disclosure, while Li et al.’s (2013) study of 
all Chinese listed firms with A-shares in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
database identifies a positive relationship between size and disclosure. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Larger Chinese firms in the financial sector tend to deliver more and 
higher-quality risk disclosure information to the market. 
3.2.2 Risk 
Based on signalling theory, as managers disclose more risk-related information investor 
uncertainty reduces. Disclosure can decrease the perceived risk associated with a firm 
 6 
because an open disclosure strategy should result in a better assessment of the firm’s future 
performance (Jorgensen and Kirscenheiter, 2003). Firms also benefit from this practice, 
because it helps them to avoid unnecessary losses, especially for high-risk firms. According 
to Elshandidy and Neri (2015), firms with higher risks usually disclose more information in 
order to avoid misunderstandings among investors, and this is consistent with Elshandidy et 
al. (2013). Firth et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between risk profile and the level of 
earnings disclosure in the Chinese market. Finally, investors also require high-risk firms to 
present the methods they have employed to evaluate risk drivers to gain deeper insights 
before making decisions. Given the above considerations, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese financial firms with higher risks are more likely to provide 
high-quality risk disclosures. 
3.2.3 Capital structure 
According to signalling theory, managers in firms heavily financed by debt tend to disclose 
more information, so as to satisfy the needs of creditors (Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
Considering the agency theory perspective, creditors of high leveraged companies should 
have greater incentives to recommend that management disclose more information. This is 
supported by Elshandidy et al. (2013), who find a positive relationship between risk level and 
risk disclosure. They also confirm that risky firms are likely to disclose more information 
than less risky firms, to avoid market misinterpretations. However, previous studies of the 
possible association between level of risk and the amount of risk disclosure have discovered 
an insignificant association (Abraham and Cox, 2007). In the Chinese context Ferguson et al. 
(2002) highlighted a positive relationship between leverage and disclosures by Chinese listed 
companies. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The capital structure of Chinese financial firms is positively 
associated with risk disclosure quality. 
3.2.4 Growth 
High-growth firms are likely to experience greater information asymmetry and higher agency 
costs (Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Gul and Leung (2004) claim that companies with a high 
growth potential need to disclose superior information to the market to signal that their 
stock is not overvalued. Considering risk disclosure, Elshandidy et al. (2013) hypothesize a 
positive relationship, but their findings do not confirm this expectation. Herein we use the 
book-to-market ratio (BTM), which represents a measure of a firm’s opportunities for 
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growth (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Investors prefer firms with a high market value in 
relation to the book value of their equity. Campbell et al.’s (2014) study of BTM value 
suggests BTM and future growth can have a direct positive or negative impact on a firm’s 
stock return. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find evidence of a positive relationship between 
BTM ratio and risk disclosure, while Liu (2015) shows a negative relationship between BTM 
and forward-looking information in the Chinese market context. This knowledge leads us to 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is no association between BTM ratio and the quality of risk 
disclosure by Chinese financial firms. 
3.2.5 Market liquidity and quality of risk disclosure 
The market-efficiency coefficient (MEC) expresses a market’s price fluidity. Markets with 
high liquidity are better equipped to support changes in price (Welker, 1995). Therefore, a 
price-based measurement is used in this paper to determine market liquidity. Higher levels 
of disclosure are expected to diminish any information asymmetry between current and 
prospective shareholders, as disclosure can increase the liquidity of a security (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004). 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that performance variability affects disclosure levels 
negatively, recognising an association between the volatility of market returns and disclosure 
levels. Furthermore, investors and analysts could include risk information in their price 
choices and recommendations and increase market liquidity by working on information 
asymmetry (Campbell et al., 2014). Elshandidy and Neri (2015) find that risk disclosure 
practices (mandatory and voluntary) provided by UK firms significantly and negatively 
influence the bid-ask spread, suggesting this information reduces information asymmetry 
between market participants improving market liquidity. Furthermore, Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015) find that voluntary, rather than mandatory, risk disclosure provided by Italian firms 
improves market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry. No significant research has 
shown that this finding is also true in the Chinese market. This knowledge leads us to 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: There is an association between market liquidity and risk disclosure 
quality for Chinese financial firms. 
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4. Sample and methodology 
4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
Our sample is based on financial firms listed in the A-shares market of the SSE for the 
period 2013-2015, as the market became more mature during this period, which makes it is 
possible to effectively evaluate risk regulation implementation in the Chinese market. 
Additionally, by covering this period we can observe any potential impact from the most 
recent (2014) financial crisis in the Chinese market. Based on a list generated by Thomson 
One, 102 financial firms were listed on the SSE in the period to 2015. Therefore, the sample 
features 102 financial firms. Firms publish their annual reports according to PRC GAAP. 
Two organisations were omitted because they were not listed during the entirety of the 
period of observation, so the final sample comprises 100 firms. All included organisations 
have a fiscal year end of 31 December, and measurements of market liquidity and 
observations were pooled for the whole period. 
Annual reports for the above firms were collected from Thomson One and from the 
companies’ websites. Data collection for risk disclosure quality focused on annual reports, 
since these are the primary source of information for investors (Miihkinen, 2013). Corporate 
governance data were collected from Orbis and manually from annual reports, while 
financial data for each firm (such as share price and market value) were collected from 
Datastream. 
4.2 Identification of variables 
In measuring the quality of risk disclosure and consistent with Miihkinen (2012), four 
measurement indicators are considered in this paper: quantity of disclosures, coverage of 
disclosures, and the semantic properties, depth and outlook.  
4.2.1 Risk disclosure quantity 
This paper uses the number of sentences concerning risk disclosure that appear in the 
annual report as a proxy for risk disclosure quantity. Thus, it is measured as: 
QUANTITYi = ln (total number of sentences containing risk disclosure) 
4.2.2 Risk disclosure coverage 
The topics identified in the annual reports are financial risks, damage risks and risk 
management (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). As suggested by Miihkinen (2012), this paper uses 
the Herfindahl index to identify the concentration of risk topics within corporate disclosures. 
COVERAGEi= [(1/H)/Number of main risk topics] 
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where H =  measures the concentration of risk topics, and Pi represents the 
proportion of risk disclosure sentences on topic i. In order to increase the Herfindahl index 
value, so that it displays comprehensive coverage of the information, this paper uses the 
inverse of H. 
4.2.3 Risk disclosure depth 
The semantic properties of the information disclosed in corporate communications include 
depth and the outlook profile. Depth concerns the content of disclosed risk information, 
which predicts any economic impact on future performance. Disclosure depth gives users a 
better understanding of firms. The empirical indicators are as follows: 
 
where kj is the number of risk information sentences in the annual report, and qualitativej 
equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains qualitative 
information about expected future performance, and otherwise is represented by 0. 
 
where kj equals the total number of sentences containing risk-related information in the 
annual report, and quantitativej equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual 
report of firm i contains quantitative information about expected future performance, and 
otherwise is represented by 0. 
4.2.4 Outlook profile 
As one of the semantic properties of risk disclosure, the outlook profile expresses how firms 
disclose their planned approach to risk (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Risk disclosures 
explain the presence of risks, the future expectations of a firm and its risk management 
approach. The empirical indicators are as follows: 
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where kj equals the number of sentences referring to risk in the annual report, and acpj 
equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains information 
about the risk management approach, and otherwise is represented by 0. 
4.2.5 Composite quality of risk disclosure 
Applying the factor analysis method, the composite quality of risk disclosure is used to 
examine the relationships between multiple variables by combining data into a smaller set. 
This measure is used to summarise the five previously-mentioned individual quality 
indicators as follows: 
QUALITY = the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue 
This paper uses the manual content analysis method to measure the quality of any 
risk disclosure, also applied in Elshandidy et al. (2013). This is preferred due to its precision 
when compared with the automated method adopted in Linsley and Shrives (2006). 
To test the reliability and validity of risk disclosure quality scores, this paper uses the 
Cronbach’s Alpha to measure how well a dataset captures an underlying construct 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013). The Cronbach’s Alpha is 94 per cent for the risk disclosure quality 
scores in this paper. Therefore, it can be concluded that the risk disclosure score computed 
using manual content analysis is internally consistent and acceptable. 
4.2.6 Firm characteristics 
This includes firm size, risk, capital structure, and growth. Definitions and measures for 
these variables are detailed in Appendix 1. 
4.2.7 Corporate governance 
This includes board size, board independence, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, state 
ownership and audit quality. Definitions and measures of these variables are detailed in 
Appendix 1. Here we control for these variables because prior research finds evidence of 
their effects on firm (risk) disclosure. 
Regarding board size, some researchers (i.e. Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) suggest that 
larger boards could be more likely to decrease actual agency costs by aligning different 
potential conflicts of interest. In the Chinese context, Firth et al. (2007) find that larger 
boards are associated with a greater level of earnings disclosure information. 
Board independence has been highlighted in previous research (Gul and Leung, 
2004) as a possible significant variable. In the Chinese context, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
find that disclosure increases the more independent directors on a board. 
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The positions of CEO and chairman should ideally be kept separate, as doing so 
should lower agency costs and improve corporate governance (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
The findings of earlier studies highlighting a negative or positive impact arising from CEO 
duality on level of disclosure are mixed (i.e. Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). 
We include State ownership as a variable, dues to the fact that many companies on 
the SSE are partially or ultimately owned by central or local governments. Wang et al. (2008) 
find the level of disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership.  
Finally, regarding audit quality, it has been argued that when financial reports are 
audited by highly-reputable external audit firms, this increases the confidence of investors 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Wang et al. (2008) illustrate that the use of large auditors does 
relate to increased levels of disclosure in the Chinese context. 
4.2.8 Market liquidity 
Under the requirement of the Chinese GAAP (PRC GAAP), audited annual reports from 
listed firms in China must be made available to public users by 30 April, four months after 
the end of the fiscal year. Consistent with Miihkinen (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015), 
this paper calculates the average relative spread over a three-month period, from the 
beginning of May to the end of July, by calculating the difference between daily ask and bid 
prices. This total is then divided by the average of the daily ask and bid prices. Share price 
volatility and trading volume are used as controls, while observing the impact of risk 
disclosure on market liquidity.  
 
4.3 Empirical model development 
This paper measures the impact of firm characteristics on risk disclosure quality and the 
influence of risk disclosure quality on market liquidity, through the use of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. The estimation model is represented as: 
Equation 1: (QAL) it = β0 + β1FS it + β2RS it +β3CS it +β4BTMit +β5BSit +β6BIit +β7CDit +β8AQit+ 
β9STit + i 
where (QAL) it is the score for the principal component with the highest eigenvalue for the 
five main risk disclosure indicators (quantity, depth_qualitative, depth_quantitative, 
outlook_profile and coverage) of firm i at time t.  
The variables in Equation 1 include firm size (FS), risk (RS), capital structure (CS) 
and growth (BTM). The control variables were selected based on previous studies 
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(Elshandidy et al., 2013). This paper uses board size (BS), board independence (BI), CEO 
duality (CD), audit quality (AQ) and state ownership (ST) as control variables. 
Equation 2: (ML) it+1 = β0 + β1QAL it + β2FS it+ β3RS it +β4CS it +β5BTMit +β6SPVit +β7TVit 
+β8BSit +β9BIit +β10CDit +β11AQit+β12STit + i 
where (ML) it+1 is the three-month average of relative spreads from the beginning of May to 
the end of July for firm i. (QAL) it is the score of the principal component with the highest 
eigenvalue for the five main risk disclosure indicators (quantity, depth_qualitative, 
depth_quantitative, outlook_profile and coverage) of firm i at time t. Firm characteristic 
variables (FS, RS, CS and BTM), corporate governance variables (BS, BI, CD, AQ and ST), 
share price volatility (SPV) and trading value (TV) are used as control variables. Appendix 1 
explains the definitions of these variables, their sources and their codes.1 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the continuous variables mentioned in 
Section 3. These include risk disclosure, market indicators, firm characteristics and corporate 
governance. This paper winsorises the variables at the first and 99th percentiles. Table I 
gives the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, lower quartile, median and 
upper quartile. The three dummy variables are CEO duality, audit quality and state 
ownership. Panel B displays their frequencies. 
The mean and median statistics for QAN and DQAL are relatively close in value, 
showing a symmetrical distribution. 
[Insert Table I] 
5.2 Regression results 
Tables II displays the OLS regression results based on the dependent variables of risk 
disclosure quality and its five quality dimensions. With the exception of COV, firm size is 
                                                 
1 The unreported (for brevity, but they are available on request from the authors) correlation coefficient 
indicates that firms with higher-quality risk disclosures also release more comprehensive risk information. This 
suggests, consistent with Miihkinen (2012), that quantity is a good proxy for quality when assessing narrative 
disclosures in annual reports. It worth considering that all quality indicators have high positive factor loadings, 
as the loadings of QUANTITY, COVERAGE, DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, and 
OUTLOOK_PROFILE are 0.983, -0.111, 0.853, 0.979 and 0.616, respectively. The first factor accounts for 
76.7 per cent of the total variance in the quality indicator of risk disclosure. 
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significantly and positively associated with all the other dimensions of risk disclosure quality 
(.222, .130, .223 and 0.41 respectively, at 1% level).  
These findings are consistent with empirical research on risk disclosure (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012; Elshandidy et al., 2015) and 
suggest that large firms have incentives to signal their ability to provide high quality 
information about their risks, differing from smaller firms. This is consistent with this 
paper’s expectation and therefore supports H1. 
While the results suggest that firm risk does not significantly influence the majority 
of risk reporting quality dimensions, it is significantly and positively associated with 
quantitative information contained in risk disclosures (.308 at 1% level). This significant 
impact is consistent with signalling theory; high-risk firms are more likely to disclose more 
risk information to avoid market misinterpretation as illustrated by some previous empirical 
findings (Elshandidy et al., 2013). The non-significant impact is consistent with the 
theoretical argument put forward by Linsley and Shrives (2006), that risky firms might be 
more sensitive to revealing more risk information in order to avoid market attention. Overall, 
and based on this discussion, our findings do not fully support H2. 
Capital structure is significantly and negatively related to quantitative risk 
information (-.019 at 1% level). The increased risk of bankruptcy and the behaviour of 
managers that tend to avoid transparency possibly explain this result. The negative 
relationship derived from these results concurs with previous studies (Miihkinen, 2012). 
Examining the other dimensions of risk quality more generally, there is no significant 
relationship between leverage and the quality (quantity) of risk disclosure, implying that in 
the Chinese financial market, capital structure is not an influential factor in revealing quality 
risk information. This does not support our H3. 
The BTM ratio is positively correlated with QAN (.044 at 1% level) and risk 
disclosure depth, both in terms of the quantitative and qualitative nature of risk information 
(.036 and .043, respectively, at the 1% level). These results suggest that the high-growth 
Chinese financial firms listed in A-shares are considerably motivated to release high quality 
risk information. While this finding does not support H4, it is still consistent with Cheng et 
al. (2006) `s findings. 
Regarding the control variables, we find that the size of the board of directors (BS) 
seems to affect risk disclosure quantity and quality, while the coefficients for board 
independence (BI) are negative in all the models illustrated in Table II, showing significant 
findings for the majority (-1.21 for QAN, -1.18 for DQAL and -1.38 for OUL at 5% level). 
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Although previous studies have reported a positive relationship between board 
independence and risk disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2007), these findings provide no 
evidence of this, confirming what is highlighted in the background section in terms of the 
governance mechanisms in the Chinese market. Audit Quality seems to have a significant 
impact on QAN (.218 at 1% level), risk disclosure depth, both in terms of the quantitative 
and qualitative nature of risk information (.264 and .213 respectively, at 1% level) and COV 
(-.018 at 5% level) while CEO duality and State Ownership are not significant over the 
period of analysis, and are also consistent with the period of transition the Chinese economy 
is experiencing.  
The aggregate level of quality of risk disclosure (QAL) shows the patterns previously 
highlighted: general positive associations with size, BTM and board size (.229, .049 and .547 
respectively, at the 1% level) and a negative relationship with the presence of independent 
board directors (-1.52 at the 5% level).  
In summary, the previous results confirm that firms’ characteristics can largely 
explain the incentives for providing high quality risk information in regard to Chinese 
financial firms. Those results indicate, to a large extent, that corporate governance factors 
have a limited influence on firms’ willingness to share risk information. 
[Insert Table II] 
Table III, in Model 1 and Model 2, shows how the quality and quantity of risk 
disclosure affect market liquidity. Our results highlight a negative association between bid-
ask spread and risk disclosure quantity and quality (-.019 and -.024 respectively, at 1% level), 
suggesting this information is useful, as investors are likely to consider it when making 
pricing decisions, given that it contributes to reducing information asymmetry among 
market participants. At the same time, risk disclosure is significantly and negatively 
associated with trading volume (-.006 for both QAN and QAL at 1% level). This could have 
been driven by trading activity on the market, which has shown an increasing pattern over 
the years and a consequent readjustment during and since the financial crisis. These results 
support H5. 
[Insert Table III] 
5.3 Further analysis: Subsample analysis and robustness checks  
Tables IV and V report the results of the subsample analysis for each of the three years 
considered, in order to verify behaviour in the cut-off year (2014), in the year before (2013) 
and in the year after (2015).  
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QAL still shows a positive association with size in each year (.207 for 2013, .210 for 
2014 and .269 for 2015 respectively, at 1% level), and BTM in 2015 and in 2013 (.060 
and .043 respectively, at the 1% and 5% levels), while a marked negative relationship with 
the presence of board independent directors is confirmed only for the year 2015 (-3.43 at 
the 1% level). QAN shows similar results to QAL in terms of: associations with size (.201 
for 2013, .208 for 2014 and .255 for 2015 respectively, at the 1% level), BTM (.39 at the 5% 
level in 2013 and .520 at the 1% level in 2015), and board independence (-3.43 at the 1% 
level in 2015). 
The analysis provided annually seems to confirm the general picture of the Chinese 
market is as previously discussed. In the year 2013 the quantity and the quality of risk 
information significantly affected market liquidity, suggesting that this information is likely 
to be informative; indeed, investors have responded by incorporating such information into 
their decisions. In the years 2014 and 2015, we did not observe any significant impact from 
risk disclosure on market liquidity. Our findings for those two years suggest Chinese firms 
over the period of crisis are likely to provide non-relevant risk information to the market. 
Collectively, our results indicate that our conclusions, as discussed under Table III are 
attributable to, and driven by, risk disclosures made in 2013.  
In reference to the other control variables for 2013, we find that SPV (-.412 and -
.427 at the 1% level for quality and quantity), TV (-.008 and -.007 at the 1% level for QAL 
and QAN) and BZ (-.089 and -.083 at the 5% level for QAL and QAN) are significantly and 
negatively related to the ask-bid spread, suggesting these factors are improving market 
liquidity. For the years 2014 and 2015, our results suggest SPV (-.120 and .375 for QAL and 
-.201 and -.375 for QAN, at the 5% level in 2014 and at the 1% level in 2015) and AQ (-.037 
and -.036 at the 5% level for QAL and QAN) impacted market liquidity during these years.  
In general, this paper confirms previous findings about the Chinese market (Luo et 
al., 2009); i.e. that, given a decreasing but still strong state presence, there is higher stock 
volatility and weak corporate governance. 
[Insert Table IV] 
[Insert Table V] 
We also ran additional tests to ascertain whether our results were affected by 
endogeneity and structural change. An endogeneity problem can arise when omitting 
variables and/or from reverse causality. First, we replicated our main analyses under Tables 
II and III by running fixed effects regressions. Arguably, these can be considered a way to 
address omitted variables, since they eliminate any influence from time-invariant 
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unobservable variables (e.g. Brown et al., 2011). The determinants of QAN and QAL risk 
disclosure under fixed effects models are broadly consistent with our general conclusions 
under Table II. Similarly, the conclusions regarding the impact of risk disclosure practices on 
market liquidity, based on the fixed effects models are consistent with those drawn based on 
Table III.  
Second, to address reverse causality, we performed the lag approach (i.e. Hoitash et 
al., 2009) to construct instrumental variables. Following prior research (Elshandidy et al., 
2015), we regressed the yearly risk by reporting quality as regards the previous year’s firm 
characteristics (defined in Appendix 1). Consistent with the findings reported previously in 
Table II, our unreported results (for brevity) show the coefficients of the lagged values for 
variables of interest (FS, RS, CS, and BTM) have theoretically plausible signs and their sizes 
are similar. This consistency suggests our data set does not contain omitted time-varying 
variables or an unobserved heterogeneity.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper examined the main drivers for risk disclosure quality, and studied the impact of 
such disclosure on market liquidity for financial firms listed on the SSE A-shares market.  
We found firm size to be the most significant factor influencing risk disclosure. 
Other firm characteristics (firm risk and capital structure), however, proved not significantly 
associated with risk disclosure quality, suggesting that these variables have no influence on 
the determination of risk disclosure. Furthermore, we found that risk disclosure quality has 
an impact on market liquidity, and when we analysed each year we noticed that the results 
were driven by the year 2013; moreover, we noticed no or little significance from the period 
of the emerging financial crisis. Our results suggest that Chinese banks provided the market 
with less informative risk information during the recent crisis of 2014, and the content of 
this information did not provide incremental value to the investors.  
These findings have several implications for investors and regulators in China. For 
investors, the findings provide insights into how firm characteristics affect managers’ 
propensity to reveal risk information. For regulators, such as the CBRC and CSRC, these 
results highlight the essential role of risk disclosure as a component of the capital market 
system. The influence of disclosure on liquidity in 2013 could be viewed as an important 
stimulus for regulators to maximise their efforts to improve reporting regulations.  
This paper’s methodology may have been limited due to its subjectivity, as there is 
inherent subjectivity when determining a coding scheme. Furthermore, the labour-intensive 
nature of the data analysis method limits scope, and as a result, only a small number of 
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companies are investigated. In order to overcome these limitations, the problems of 
subjectivity and labour-intensiveness could be resolved by adopting automated content 
analysis (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013). Furthermore, taking into account the trend towards 
globalisation in the Chinese economy, further researchers might also investigate the impact 
of these variables on risk disclosure across different nations. 
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Table I. 
Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Risk Disclosure Indicators: 
Quantity (QAN) 300 3.974 0.872 3.401 3.663 4.905 
Coverage (COV) 300 0.632 0.063 0.601 0.657 0.681 
Depth_Quantitative (DQAN) 300 0.721 0.837 0.000 0.693 1.386 
Depth_Qualitative (DQAL) 300 3.954 0.867 3.367 3.651 4.871 
Outlook_Profile (OUL) 300 1.668 0.642 1.386 1.609 2.079 
Quality (QAL) 300 0.002 0.993 -0.721 -0.390 1.180 
 
Reporting Incentives: 
Firms Size (FS) 300 15.26 2.647 13.875 15.099 16.424 
Risk (RS) 300 0.280 0.305 0.105 0.250 0.470 
Capital Structure (CS) 300 1.928 1.902 0.494 1.419 2.663 
Book-to-Market (BTM) 292 3.100 4.302 1.135 1.795 3.100 
Board Size (BS) 300 2.375 0.276 2.303 2.303 2.485 
Board Independence (BI) 300 0.373 0.052 0.333 0.364 0.400 
 
Market Indicators: 
Market Liquidity (ML) 293 0.133 0.884 0.066 0.109 0.176 
Trading Volume (TV) 300 3.661 3.169 1.535 2.844 4.483 
Share Price Volatility (SPV) 300 0.415 0.098 0.355 0.417 0.480 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
Ceo Duality (CD) 42 (14%) 258 (86%) 
Audit Quality (AQ) 105 (35%) 195 (65%) 
State Ownership (ST) 139 (47%) 161 (53%) 
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Panel A explains the descriptive statistics of all variables. These include risk disclosure, firm characteristics, corporate 
governance and market indicators. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by 
eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile. Panel B shows the frequencies of the three dummy variables, CEO 
duality (CD), audit quality (AQ) and state ownership (ST). Definitions of the above variables are identical to those given in 
Table I, and as detailed in Appendix 1. All statistics are based on a sample of all financial firms in the Shanghai A-shares 
market are listed only in China.  
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Table II. 
Regression Results for the Various Quality Dimensions of Risk Disclosure and for Quality of Risk Disclosure 
  QAN COV DQAN DQAL OUL  QAL  
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
FS + .222*** 10.47  .003 1.24 .130*** 5.31 .223*** 10.53 .041** 1.72 .229*** 9.02 
RS + .134  1.23 .021* 1.66 .308*** 2.45 .123 1.13 -.130 -1.04 .171 1.31 
CS + -.010 -.57 .001 .31 -.019*** -.92 -.010 -.55 .033* 1.56 -.005 -.023 
BTM ? .044***  4.94 .001 .27 .036*** 3.55 .043*** 4.89 .008 .84 .049*** 4.55 
BS + .420*** 2.47 -.052*** -2.67 .670*** 3.41 .401*** 2.37 .174 .90 .547*** .2.68 
BI + -1.21** -1.83 -.011 -.14 -.684 -.89 -1.18** -1.79 -1.38** -1.83 -1.52** -1.90 
CD - .008 .09 .002 .18 -.069 -.64 .013 .15 -.124 -1.18 -.041 -.037 
AQ + .218*** 2.50 -.018** -1.81 .264*** 2.63 .213*** 2.46 -.035 .35 .246 2.35 
ST ? .009 .13 -.006 -.73 .128* 1.60 .000 .00 -.019 -.24 .030 .36 
Intercept  -.189 -.40 .715*** 13.20 -2.91*** -5.32 -.177 -.38 1.09** 2.02 -4.52*** -7.96 
          
Adjusted R-squared  0.6033 0.0319 0.4320 0.6012 0.0688  0.5560  
F-statistics  50.17 2.07 25.60 49.74 3.39  41.49  
Observation  292 292 292 292 292  292  
Mean VIF  1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59  1.59  
Max VIF  3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22  3.22  
This table shows the impact of firm characteristics and control variables on risk disclosure quantity and quality. The R-squared value describes the model’s ability to account for 
changes in each risk quality indicator. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Definitions of the 
above variables are detailed in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance for two-tailed tests at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
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Table III. 
OLS Regressions of the Impact of Risk Disclosure Quality and Quantity on Market 
Liquidity 
  Market Liquidity 
Model 1 
QAL 
Model 2  
QAN 
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
QAL ? -.019*** -2.39   
QAN ?   -.024*** -2.43 
FS + .003 .71 .004 .87 
RS + -.013 -.73 -.014 -.75 
CS + .003 .93 .003 .87 
BTM ? -.000 -.27 -.000 -.20 
SPV - -.049 -.72 -.048 -.71 
TV - -.006*** -2.99 -.006*** -2.99 
BS + .016 .56 .016 .56 
BI + -.071 -.65 -.071 -.65 
CD - -.017 -1.10 -.016 -1.04 
AQ + -.013 -.90 -.012 -.87 
ST ? .004 .31 .003 .29 
Intercept  .123 1.20 .205** 2.15 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.0535 0.0541 
F-statistics  2.34 2.35 
Observation  285 285 
Mean VIF  1.82 1.87 
Max VIF  4.65 4.97 
This table shows the results concerning the impact of risk disclosure quality and quantity on market 
liquidity for financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Definitions 
of the above variables are detailed in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance for two-tailed 
tests at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
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Table IV. 
Regression Results for the Quality and Quantity of Risk Disclosure spread by year 
 
   The Quality and Quantity of Risk Disclosure 
  2013 2014 2015 
  Model 1 
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
Model 1  
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
Model 1 
QAL  
Model 2 
QAN  
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
FS + .207*** 4.49 .201*** 5.14 .210*** 3.95 .208*** 4.89 .269*** 6.65 .255*** 7.35 
RS + .383 1.45 .304 1.36 .269 1.07 .202 1.00 .165 .76 .082 .44 
CS + .009 .24 .008 .24 -.005 .13 -.015 -.45 -.022 -.60 -.026 -.84 
BTM ? .043** 2.08 .39** 2.20 .034 1.32 .035* 1.68 .060*** 3.99 .520*** 4.02 
BS + .658* 1.86 .581 1.93 .795* 1.96 .535* 1.66 .144 .42 .108 .37 
BI + .019 .01 .381 .32 -.469 -.30 -.598 -.47 -4.00*** -3.00 -3.43*** -3.00 
CD - .007 .03 .90 .44 -.046 -.24 .012 .08 -.131 -.76 -.092 -.62 
AQ + .208 1.06 .189 1.13 .200 1.05 .213 1.40 .262 1.51 .193 1.30 
ST ? .008 .05 .005 .04 -.0.41 .26 -.040 -.32 .124 .87 .614 .50 
Intercept  -5.08*** -5.07 -910 -1.07 -5.04*** -4.82 -.399 -.48 -3.36*** -3.40 .845 1.00 
              
Adjusted R-
squared 
 0.5215  0.5745 0.5085  0.5732  0.5999  0.6250  
F-statistics  12.62  15.40 12.03  15.32  17.16  18.97  
Observation  97  97 97  97  98  98  
Mean VIF  1.62  1.62 1.76  1.76  1.66  1.66  
Max VIF  3.06  3.06 4.03  4.03  3.24  3.24  
This table displays the impact of firm characteristics and control variables on the quality and quantity of risk disclosure. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Definitions of the above variables are detailed in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance for two-tailed tests at the 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
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Table V. 
OLS Regressions of the Impact of Risk Disclosure on Market Liquidity spread by year 
  Market Liquidity 
  2013 2014 2015 
  Model 1 
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
Model 1  
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
Model 1 
QAL  
Model 2 
QAN  
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
QAL ? -.044*** -3.08   .002 .28   -.011 -.84   
QAN ?   -.058*** -3.47   .000 .03   -.013 -.86 
FS + -.001 -.08 .002 .25 -.003 -.59 -.002 -.47 -.002 -.40 -.002 -.32 
RS  -.039 -1.13 -.039 -1.14 -.020 -.95 -.019 -.92 -.046** -1.69 -.047** -1.73 
CS + .008* 1.54 .008* 1.61 .005 1.26 .005 1.26 .008* 1.91 .008** 1.88 
BTM ? .001 .25 .001 .39 -.000 -.16 -.000 -.12 -.002 -1.18 -.002 -1.17 
SPV - -.412*** -3.34 -.427*** -3.50 -.120** -1.94 -.201** -1.95 -.375*** -3.57 -.375*** -3.59 
TV - -.008*** -2.56 -.007*** -2.39 -.003 -1.23 -.003 -1.17 -.002 -.89 -.002 -.88 
BS + -.089** -1.85 -.083** -1.74 .030 .88 .032 .94 .035 .80 .035 .81 
BI + -.152 -.81 -.126 -.68 -.131 -1.02 -.132 -1.03 -.037 -.22 -.038 -.23 
CD - .015 .47 .020 .64 -.008 -.47 -.008 -.49 -.002 -.11 -.002 -.11 
AQ + .016 .62 .017 .70 -.024* -1.45 -.023 -1.40 -.037** -1.73 -.036** -1.75 
ST ? .008 .43 .009 .45 .002 .14 .002 .14 .010 .55 .009 .52 
Intercept  .660*** 3.72 .833*** 5.04 .199 1.51 .186 1.51 .271** 1.79 .316 2.22 
              
Adjusted R-squared  0.2245  0.2459 0.0706  0.0697  0.1573  0.1577  
F-statistics  3.27  3.55 1.60  1.59  2.46  2.47  
Observation  95  95 95  95  95  95  
Mean VIF  1.90  1.96 2.09  2.16  1.98  2.03  
Max VIF  4.51  4.71 4.74  5.57  4.88  5.33  
This table shows the results concerning the impact of risk disclosure quality and quantity on market liquidity for financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market on yearly 
basis. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Definitions of the above variables are detailed in 
Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance for two-tailed tests at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
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Appendix 1. Summary of variable definitions, measures and sources 
Variable Definition and measures Source 
Panel A: Continuous variables   
Risk disclosure incentives   
QAN 
Quantity refers to the amount of sentences containing risk information and is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of sentences containing risk information in annual reports 
Thomson One  /  
Company website 
COV 
Coverage is the coverage of risk information contained in the annual reports and is calculated as the inverse 
of the Herfindahl index value divided by the number of risk topics 
Thomson One  / 
 Company website 
DQAN 
Depth_Quantitative includes the quantity risk-related information about expected future performance and 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of risk information sentences containing quantitative 
information 
Thomson One  /  
Company website 
DQAL 
Depth_Qualitative includes the quality risk-related information about expected future performance and is 
the natural logarithm of the number of risk information sentences containing qualitative information 
Thomson One / 
 Company website 
OUL 
Outlook_Profile refers to information about the risk management approach and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of risk information sentences containing firms’ future actions regarding the identified risk 
Thomson One  / 
 Company website 
QAL 
Composite is the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue calculated from the above 
five indicators 
Thomson One  / 
 Company website 
Reporting incentives   
FS Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenues  Datastream 
RS 
Risk is measured by the beta, which is the covariance expressing a firm’s market return compared with a 23- 
to 25-month market index Datastream 
CS Capital structure is measured as the log of leverage Datastream 
BTM Book-to-market is measured as the ratio of the book value of equity divided by its market value Datastream 
BS Board size is the total number of directors on the board Orbis/Annual report 
BI Board independence is the ratio of independent NEDs to board size Orbis/Annual report 
Market indicators   
ML 
Market liquidity, measured as the three-month average of relative spreads from beginning of May to end of 
July Datastream 
TV Trading volume, measured as the daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares Datastream 
SPV Share price volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily stock prices Datastream 
Panel B: Dicotomous variables   
CD 
CEO duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an individual holds both the position of CEO and 
chairman 
Orbis/Annual report/
Company website 
AQ 
Audit quality is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the external auditor is one of the Big Four audit 
firms 
Orbis/Annual report/
Company website 
ST State ownership is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is ownded by the Chinese state 
Orbis/Annual report/
Company website 
This table provides the definition and measures of risk reporting, firm, market and corporate governance characteristics. It also provides the source of 
each variable.  
 
